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Abstract  
Two decades ago many commentators suggested that economic globalisation had eroded social 
democratic economic policy capacity. Although this argument has largely been discredited, the 
global financial crisis (GFC) has revived the state-market debate. As governments succumb to fiscal 
consolidation, a similar theory of declining state capacity now challenges social democrats. This 
article redresses the contemporary situation by using the economic globalisation debate from the 
mid-1990s to 2005 as a lens through which to comparatively analyse the current fiscal policy 
positions of the Parti Socialiste and the Labour Party. It draws similarities between the two 
situations and illustrates how contested notions of the contemporary political economy constrain 
social democratic fiscal policy capacity, suggesting that greater capacity exists than is currently 
acknowledged. 
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Introduction  
By the 1990s, after almost two decades of financial deregulation in the developed 
economies, many commentators from across the political spectrum understood economic 
globalisation to be a growing and inescapable force of modern capitalism (see Gray 1996; 
1997; Giddens 1998; Kurzer 1993; Moses 1994). Globalisation was seen to cut markets free 
from the traditional regulatory mechanisms of states and, in doing so, heighten the influence 
of markets, which favour liberal economic policies, at the expense of sovereign policy 
autonomy. The dilemma therein, as far as this article is concerned, is, as Kurzer neatly 
surmised, that this ‘hurts social democratic governments more than conservative ones’ 
(Kurzer 1993: 252; see Moses 1994). The inherent aim of social democracy, to regulate 
capitalism for the benefit of working people, was thus being rendered unachievable by the 
power of these new global markets (see Gray 1996; 1997; Huber and Stephens 1998; Kurzer 
1993; Moses 1994).  
Although since the mid-1990s a substantive literature has ably dismantled this thesis of 
neoliberal convergence, it could be argued that today, in post-global financial crisis (GFC) 
Europe, a similar theory of the state-market dynamic continues to hold sway. A substantial 
element of the discourse which has emerged since 2008 presents a confused understanding of 
the nature of the crisis in Europe, often positing government expenditure as a central cause of 
the crisis situation (Blyth 2013a: 6; Hay 2013; Sawyer 2012: 209). European governments are 
currently attempting to slash their public debt burdens and prove their economic credibility 
by implementing large-scale fiscal consolidation programmes. This strategy, some have 
suggested, is characteristic of a state of permanent austerity now imposed by markets (see 
Streeck 2011; Streeck and Mertens 2011). This reading of the crises reinforces the idea, once 
again, that the role of the state is necessarily diminished in the face of exogenous market 
forces. The adage that ‘there is no alternative’, therefore, continues to hold great relevance in 
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post-crisis Europe. Revisiting these themes in the post-crisis environment, as this article does, 
is therefore critical to understanding the governing capacities of not only European social 
democrats, but the very states in which they operate. 
In rejecting dominant accounts of the crisis, this article draws upon analyses that have helped 
to demonstrate that, despite the ‘crisis of debt discourse’ which abounds, the Eurozone crisis 
is best understood as the fallout from the crisis of particular liberal growth models (see 
Callinicos 2012; Hay 2013; Hay and Wincott 2012; Sawyer 2012). This article hopes to add 
to this post-crisis literature by using the economic globalisation debate, from the early 1990s 
up until the mid-2000s, as a lens through which to appreciate how social democrats today 
engage with economic arguments presented as de facto structural dilemmas, but which, in 
reality, are contested notions of political economic space. In doing so it supports the 
argument that greater economic policy capacity remains in post-GFC Europe, but suggests 
that first social democrats must set out a clear and assertive direction for change. 
In order to test the study’s central hypothesis, that social democratic economic policy 
capacity has been constrained by the accommodation of contestable economic ideas as de 
facto structural conditions, the study utilises a comparative analysis of France’s Parti 
Socialiste (PS) and the British Labour Party. The analysis is divided into two separate 
periods; the first begins in 1997 as both parties form governments and ends in the mid-2000s, 
as the PS lose power and Labour begin their third term in office. The latter analysis looks at 
the PS and Labour in the post-GFC environment, as constituted under François Hollande and 
Ed Miliband respectively, and considers how the PS have engaged with the debate over 
economic policy autonomy in government and how Labour have adapted in opposition. By 
comparing the French dirigiste model to the British liberal-market variant, a significant 
variation in social democratic models will be considered (Gerring 2006: 89, 97-100), 
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allowing at least a degree of wider significance for European social democracy to be gleaned 
from its conclusions. Both cases are profiled using party output, including speeches made to 
both domestic and international audiences, party documents and other relevant publications, 
as a means of establishing the two parties’ economic strategies.  
In defining social democracy, the article utilises a ‘value-led’ approach, rather than focusing 
on specific institutions or policies. It draws on Hirst’s (1999: 87) concept of the three 
‘essential and enduring’ elements of social democracy, which posits that social democracy 
attempts to minimise of the ‘cost of capitalism’ through employment and welfare policies, 
reduce inequalities of power and wealth, and that it does so within a parliamentary 
democracy and market economy. The study adds to this definition, moreover, by drawing 
upon Hay’s concept of ‘democratic economic governance’, described as ‘the principle that 
the market, left to its own devices, can only generate outcomes which are inefficient, 
inequitable and unacceptable’ (Hay 1999: 57). Thus, an inherent degree of scepticism 
towards the market is embedded in the definition of social democracy set out here. 
Furthermore, the analysis of ‘fiscal policy’ within this article considers, more narrowly, 
aspects of fiscal policy, including welfare, job creation, healthcare spending and house 
building, that may be broadly understood as representative of these ‘social democratic’ 
values. Due to space limitations the study is, moreover, restricted to a focus on the impact 
financial markets, in particular bond and equity markets, have had (at least theoretically) on 
the fiscal policies of the two parties. Finance has been selected because of its relevance both 
within the post-crisis discourse, as well as the economic globalisation debate in the decade 
prior to the crisis.  
It is pertinent here to also establish what this article is not attempting to do. The study is not 
seeking, nor would it be possible, to refute per se arguments that support austerity as an 
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economic recovery strategy, or indeed the thesis of economic globalisation and capital 
mobility. Rather, this article merely intends to highlight that both theses remain, in fact, 
highly contested. In doing so, the article attempts to illustrate the contingent nature of the 
perceived fiscal capacities of the PS and Labour, and thus demonstrate that a greater policy 
capacity exists beyond that which is currently acknowledged. The article is structured into 
three main sections; in the first the debate is set up through a review of the relevant existing 
literature. The second section presents an analysis of the two cases pre-crisis, focusing on the 
economic globalisation debate, whilst the third section considers the contemporary impact of 
post-crisis discourse on social democratic fiscal activism, before setting out a short discussion 
of the ongoing potential for social democratic economic policy autonomy.  
 
European Social Democracy: Pessimism, Pragmatism and Scepticism 
The relationship between markets, states and European social democracy has already 
been widely discussed. The debate remains absolutely critical, however, because, as will be 
shown, if some theories were taken at face value, social democracy would have been 
considered obsolete three decades ago, with neoliberal reform the only path open to policy-
makers. As this review of the literature also shows, the GFC represented a critical juncture in 
the debate over the role of the state. Yet, despite initial optimism, the outlook for social 
democrats in post-crisis Europe is bleak. Below, three discernible ‘waves’ of scholarship of 
particular relevance to this study are outlined.   
First wave: globalists  
The first distinct wave of literature, which was particularly influential in the 1990s, 
can be characterised by its focus on economic globalisation as the cause of social 
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democracy’s apparent demise. Economic globalisation, it was argued, had become an 
inexorable force of the modern age, a force to which all economies must ultimately either 
choose to adapt to, or lose out (see Kurzer 1993: 252; Giddens 1998). This process, as 
understood by such authors, allowed capital to become increasingly internationally mobile, 
and thus ‘outgrow’ sovereign economic regulation and policy instruments (Kurzer 1993: 251 
Gray 1996: 32; Gray 1997; Ohmae 1990; 1996). John Gray’s claim that it is ‘no exaggeration 
to say that the global freedom of capital…effectively demolishes the economic foundations of 
social democracy’ (Gray 1996: 17), captures the essence of the globalist argument. 
Enormous figures of international financial capital movement are often invoked in these 
works which, it is suggested, has ‘made every high-spending government vulnerable to 
financial asset holders’ (Perraton et al. 1997: 265; Giddens 1998: 30; Kurzer 1993: 252). This 
vulnerability is theorised in terms of the ‘structural dependency’ of the state on capital (see 
Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988; see Kurzer 1993: 252; Moses 1994). If markets do not 
agree with a particular economic policy, the argument goes, they can punish a state by 
quickly moving capital out of an economy. Traditional social democratic policy tools 
designed to regulate capitalism, therefore, may have worked in conditions where ‘control of 
capital was both possible and desirable’, but have since been rendered impotent by economic 
globalisation (Moses 1994: 133; see Giddens 1998: 16). Kurzer (1993: 252), for instance, 
argues that government proposals to increase public investment, which heighten expectations 
of a rise in inflation, ‘motivate financial asset holders to invest in other, more stable 
currencies’. Progressive employment and welfare policies, therefore, whilst desirable, can be 
quickly ‘interdicted by global bond markets’, making them no longer politically sustainable 
(Gray 1997: 23-28), and thus disproportionately hurt social democrats. This, Moses suggested 
in 1994, was the new ‘iron law of policy’ in the international economy (Moses 1994: 142).  
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Second wave: optimists and sceptics 
In response to this globalist literature a second wave of literature, which developed 
from the mid-1990s, sought to challenge the claim economic globalisation had caused the 
death of social democracy. Within this second wave, two separate schools of thoughts can be 
distinguished. The first group of theorists are characterised by the claim that economic 
globalisation, although a powerful constraining influence on states, has not necessarily 
enforced conditions of neoliberal homogeneity, and thus social democrats retain ‘room to 
manoeuvre’ in a globalised economy (see Clift 2002a; 2002b; Clift and Tomlinson 2004; 
2007; Garrett 1998a; 1998b; Merkel and Petring 2007; Pontusson 2011; Swank 2002). 
Garrett finds, for example, that the policy strictures imposed by global capital are ‘not nearly 
so tight as is often presumed’. He points to the high levels of public debt in both Belgium and 
Italy, and shows how interest rates on their respective government bonds remained stable and 
relatively low over the previous decade (1998a: 801-3). Garrett (1998a: 804) suggests that, ‘if 
this is the most brutal fiscal repression wrought by global finance among the industrial 
countries, the proclamations of many commentators would seem somewhat hyperbolic’.  
Yet, whilst Garrett made clear that his intention was ‘not to debate the merits of calling 
markets “global”’ (Garrett 1998b: 791, emphasis added), a second cluster of authors sought 
to move away from the established structural focus within the literature on economic 
‘globalisation’ altogether. This more sceptical group of theorists have presented strong 
empirical research to show that economic globalisation is not occurring, or at least is not 
occurring in the way many expect (see Hirst and Thompson 1999; Hay 2000; 2004a; Hay and 
Wincott 2012; Kleinknecht and ter Wengel 1998; Vandenbroucke 1998). These authors have 
highlighted, for example, the fact that the European Union could more accurately be 
described as a ‘closed economy’ (Kleinknecht and ter Wengel 1998: 638) than one 
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experiencing ‘globalisation’. This, in turn, has significant implications for the capacities of 
governments because, in contrast to the ‘race to the bottom’ predicted by globalists, in a 
regional economy such as the EU, competition may not solely be based on cost (Hay and 
Wincott 2012: 92). Thus social democratic economic policies, such as a strong welfare state, 
are not crippled by economic integration, and can even act to enhance an economy’s 
attractiveness to trade and investment (Kleinknecht and ter Wengel 1998: 645-6; Pontusson 
2011).  
What emerges very clearly from this second wave literature (leaving aside the disagreements 
therein) is that economic globalisation is by no means an incontrovertible phenomenon. 
However its presence in both historic and contemporary economic policy debates is manifest. 
Of great importance to this study, therefore, is the incorporation of analyses of how political 
actors continue to engage with the idea of economic globalisation within this second wave 
literature (Hay and Rosamond 2002; see Hay 2000; Rosamond 2003; Watson 2001). As Hay 
and Rosamond noted (2002: 148), ‘whether the globalization thesis is “true” or not may 
matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those 
employing it’. This point captures the salience of employing an ideational analysis (see 
Campbell 1998; Clift 2012; Hay 2004a; 2004b; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Schmidt 2008) to 
elucidate the significant implications that engaging with the economic globalisation theory 
has had for social democrats. In turn, this article then attempts to show how this framework 
of analysis offers a valuable new insight into the study of post-crisis European social 
democracy. 
Third wave: post-crisis literature 
The GFC and the subsequent crisis in Europe have, of course, served to reignite and 
reshape the debate over the relationship between states, markets and social democratic policy 
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potentialities. A survey of the post-crisis literature reveals a great deal of valuable research on 
both the causes of the crisis and its consequences for social democracy, which will be briefly 
covered here. As many authors have shown, it is clear that there were significant failings in 
the neoliberal financial regulatory system in the years leading up to 2008 (Hay 2013; Laski 
and Podkaminer 2012; Mügge 2011). A greater reliance on the financial sector for economic 
growth, particularly in the US and UK, via debt-fuelled private consumption and new 
financial products had a significant impact on the culture and politics of economic growth. 
The ‘financialization’ (see Epstein 2005: 3) of developed economies ultimately placed ‘more 
aspects of economic and social life at the risk of volatility from financial instability’ 
(FESSUD 2011: 11; see also Dore 2008; Foster 2007; Magdoff and Sweezy 1972: 13-16). 
The bursting of the US subprime mortgage bubble, the epitome of this volatile growth model, 
had a devastating effect on financial systems around the world. Yet, despite these liberal 
regulatory failings, the GFC was not a springboard for a renewal of social democratic policy 
activism (Crouch 2013), as may have reasonably been predicted.  
The initial policy response to the GFC has been described as boldly Keynesian, as states 
bailed out their domestic banks and key sectors of industry (Callinicos 2012: 66). Yet, within 
twelve months the policy paradigm had altered fundamentally, with ‘expansionary fiscal 
consolidation’ established as the primary recovery strategy in Europe (see Blyth 2013a; 
Callinicos 2012; Grimshaw and Rubery 2012; King et al. 2012). This strategy of large 
reductions in government expenditure, it is suggested, may result in growth through increased 
private consumption, as a result of altered market perceptions of the state’s economic 
competency (see Giavazzi and Pagano 1990). This argument was given significant empirical 
support in the post-crisis environment as a result of the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
influential paper (2010), which found that countries with over 90 percent debt-to-GDP 
experience significantly reduced rates of growth (2010: 277). 
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It is this new economic environment that, according to some, has restricted the ability of 
states to exert significant influence over economic policy. Streeck, for example, suggests that 
the GFC and subsequent crisis in Europe have led to a ‘profound restructuring of the 
democratic-capitalist political economy’ (2014: 144). All governments are now, he argues, in 
the stranglehold of international markets, as now all political parties ‘must be publicly 
pledged to “sound finance”, or else the cost of debt service will rise’ (2011: 25-27; Streeck 
and Mertens 2011). Ultimately, Streeck suggests, governments must conform to market-
appeasing economic policies, such as austerity, or else they will be punished. This argument 
provides an important juncture, for it captures a shared common theoretical lineage between 
contemporary political debates over the capacity of the state in economic recovery strategies 
and globalist arguments found within the first wave literature of the 1990s. It asserts, once 
again, that the exogenous influence of the market has wrestled economic policy autonomy 
away from state actors.  
In challenging this claim, this article draws upon further analyses within this third wave 
which have sought to reassess the causes of, and responses to, the GFC and Eurozone crisis 
(see Blyth 2013a; Boyer 2012; Callinicos 2012; Hay 2013; Hay and Wincott 2012; Sawyer 
2012). Indeed, as Boyer (2012: 284) has illustrated, a shift in the debate moved focus away 
from the regulatory weaknesses in the financial sector and towards the perception that lax 
public spending policies brought about the European crisis per se. As authors within this third 
wave of literature have shown, austerity measures have been constructed in an environment 
in which  the perceived fiscal recklessness of governments in the years preceding the crisis is 
at the heart of the dominant discourse (see Blyth 2013a; Hay 2013: 24; King et al. 2012: 2). 
The chronology of this narrative of public debt, which has given rise to austerity policies, is, 
however, deeply problematic. As has been clearly illustrated elsewhere in the literature, 
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sovereign debt only became a significant problem for European states after the impact of the 
private-sector financial crisis, as governments bailed out their domestic banks and other 
important faltering sectors (see Blyth 2013a; Hay 2013). The narrative that has emerged since 
2010, therefore, which focuses on debt as the cause of the crisis rather than a consequence of 
an originating financial crisis, ‘confuses correlation and causation’ (Blyth 2013a: 70-73; see 
Hay 2013: 24). As Hay shows (2013), this is a greatly important distinction because a more 
appropriate discourse, which considers the crisis of the liberal finance-led growth model, 
would generate a vastly divergent policy paradigm. Significantly also the evidence supporting 
austerity as an effective tool for crisis recovery is negligible. Despite its enormous political 
influence, Reinhart and Rogoff’s study (2010) was found to contain significant data errors 
and sample omissions which warped its findings, with a review paper proving that countries 
with over 90 percent debt-to-GDP actually experience average growth rates of around 2.2 
percent (Herndon et al. 2014). Furthermore, recent studies, including the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook report (Leigh et al. 2010), have highlighted the scarcity of evidence to 
support the expansionary fiscal consolidation thesis (see also Blyth 2013b). 
This article hopes to build upon this work and add to the post-crisis literature by developing 
our understanding of how such debates shape the economic policy strategies of social 
democrats in France and the UK. To do so it develops an analysis of the association between 
the globalisation debate and contemporary post-crisis discourse, something that has not yet 
been so clearly delineated in the post-crisis literature, as a means of reframing the 
contemporary debate over social democratic fiscal capacity. The following section, therefore, 
begins this analytical process by setting out the cases of Labour and the PS during the period 
1997-2005 in the context of the economic globalisation debate.  
 
   12 
 
Social Democrats and Economic Globalisation 
As outlined above, this section will set out an analysis of the Labour Party and the PS 
in relation to their engagement with the theory of economic globalisation. In particular, it will 
portray how both parties’ interacted with ideas surrounding the global financial markets and 
what effect these understandings had on their fiscal policies whilst in government. 
New Labour 
New Labour under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown understood globalisation to be an 
inexorable force of the modern age that must be adapted to. Drawing on the Third Way 
ideology (see Giddens 1994; 1998), Blair suggested in 1998 that there were three responses 
to the inevitable challenge of economic globalisation, ‘resist change - futile; let it happen - 
laissez-faire - each person for themselves, each country for itself; or, the third way, we 
manage change, together’ (Blair 1998a). Even in the latter stages of Blair’s tenure Labour’s 
stance on economic globalisation was fixed, with Blair declaring that there was ‘no mystery 
about what works: an open, liberal economy, prepared constantly to change to remain 
competitive’ (Blair 2005). 
New Labour’s rhetoric on the financial markets consistently highlighted the unavoidable 
power of exogenous market forces over the capacities of sovereign policy makers. ‘We live 
in a completely new world. Every day about one trillion dollars moves across the foreign 
exchanges… If the markets don't like your policies they will punish you’, Blair repeated 
(Blair 1999a; 1999b), echoing the warnings of ‘structural dependency’ theorists found in the 
first wave literature (see Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988). This forced New Labour to 
accommodate the preferences of the market, therefore, as its primary concern. Echoing 
globalist policy prescriptions, Labour asserted their economic discipline by ‘depoliticising’ 
monetary policy through making independent the Bank of England, and publically declaring 
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that they were ready ‘to achieve our priorities in a new and changing global market place’ 
(Brown 1997; 1999).  
Credibility and stability were outlined as the pillars of Labour’s macroeconomic policy, with 
Balls suggesting that these principles ‘flow logically from changes in the world economy … 
over the past twenty or thirty years’ (Balls 1998: 117). The Labour Party understood, Balls 
(1998: 124) made clear, ‘in a world of rapidly mobile capital, governments can have policy 
credibility and maintain constrained policy discretion if they pursue, and are seen to be 
pursuing, monetary and fiscal policies which are well understood and sustainable over the 
long term’. Labour sought, therefore, to repeatedly reaffirm its credibility to the financial 
markets, portraying the party as both responsive and responsible, as seen in Brown’s constant 
reminders that New Labour were the ‘credible radicals for the 21st century’ (Brown 1999, 
emphasis added; see Brown 1997; Brown 1998). 
The implications that this reading of the global financial order had for Labour’s fiscal policies 
are clear. Labour’s welfare policy, for instance, is indicative of the party’s desire to prove its 
fiscal responsibility to the markets, driven by an internalisation of the theory of ‘structural 
dependency’. One key aspect of New Labour’s welfare approach was centred on ‘making 
work pay more than benefit’ as a means of reducing welfare expenditure. The party suggested 
that underlying this ‘welfare-to-work’ regime was the ‘challenge of modern employment’ in 
the global economy (Blair 1998a; 1998b: 9; 2005; 2006; Brown 2004; 2006). This strategy 
included introducing a national minimum wage in 1998 and Working Families Tax Credit, 
later replaced and extended with Child and Working Tax Credits, to ‘top up’ the take-home 
pay of low-wage families. Such policies allowed the Labour government to exert greater 
control over the transfer benefits to selected groups such as low-income families, thereby 
ensuring ‘sound public finances’ (Merkel and Petring 2007: 132-4). Closely related to this 
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policy was the ‘New Deal’, offered at first to young unemployed people, and later other 
groups with high rates of unemployment. The ‘New Deal’ workfare programme offered those 
eligible several choices for skills training or work placements, yet no option to remain on 
unemployment benefit (Glyn and Wood 2001: 53; Schröter 2004: 20). Moreover, its later 
movement towards ‘asset-based welfare’, encouraged individuals to ‘think of themselves first 
and foremost as active saver-investors’, rather than as passive recipients of state welfare 
(Watson 2009: 3). 
Labour hoped, therefore, to project an image to global financial markets of both an efficient 
state and citizenry. Whilst the party may have claimed that it was pursuing a longer-term 
strategy enabled by fiscal discipline early on (Clift and Tomlinson 2007), it is clear that 
Labour ultimately remained keen to prune back, in particular, welfare expenditure. For 
example, spending on housing and healthcare remained relatively consistent with 1996-97 
levels during 1997-2001, and rose in line with overall spending on services in Labour’s 
second term. However, expenditure on social protection was cut immediately from 13.4% of 
GDP in 1997-8 to 12.8% by the following year, and did not rise above 13.4% of GDP again 
until 2008-09, when the consequences of the GFC were being felt (adapted from H.M. 
Treasury 2014: table 8b). Although not a drastic cutback, when it is considered that social 
protection expenditure under the Conservative government in the five years before 1997 
averaged 14.2% of GDP (authors calculations from H.M. Treasury 2014: table 8b), Labour’s 
strategy of targeting welfare spending becomes clear. As Wickham-Jones has noted, it seems 
New Labour was ‘determined to secure business confidence, regardless of the costs for their 
social democratic beliefs’ (1997: 264, emphasis added; see Leggett 2005: 555). 
The Parti Socialiste  
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Unlike the rigidly market-orientated New Labour, the PS during Lionel Jospin’s 
tenure as Prime Minister retained a strong statist ideology (Merkel 2000), rejecting the pensée 
unique and ‘competitive disinflation’ policies which characterised Mitterrand’s presidency 
after his 1983 ‘U-turn’ (see Jospin 1995; Clift 1998; 2002a; 2002b; 2005). The party was able 
to retain a more critical perception of globalisation, aided by a more widespread anti-
globalisation narrative within French politics (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 153) than that found 
in Britain after 18 years of Conservative governments ‘ideologically committed to neo-liberal 
reform’ (Callaghan and Tunney 2000: 71; Schmidt 2001: 247). Jospin’s Réalisme de Gauche 
fits more closely in line with the second wave theorists, for whilst acknowledging economic 
globalisation as a new ‘international reality’ (Jospin 2002), the party underlined the enduring 
‘marges de manœuvre’ available to social democratic policy-makers (Moscovici 1997 cited 
in Clift 1999: 5; see Clift 2002a; 2005). For Jospin’s PS, globalisation was a ‘political 
question, which requires a political response’ (Jospin 2001a).  
One aspect of the PS’s ‘political response’ came in the form of European Union level 
activism, building on Jacques Delors’ idea of ‘l’Europe Sociale’ (see Delors 1993; Josselin 
2002; Jospin 2001b; 2002; Jean Le Garrec interview in Clift 1999: 16). Yet, despite the 
tangible fiscal constraints brought about by deeper EU integration (see Cole 1999: 79; Clift 
and Tomlinson 2004: 521; Hay 2004a: 232), including the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
the PS remained keen to stress that, even without such a treaty, the heightened global 
mobility of capital now requires every government to ‘convince the markets or investors’ of 
their credibility (Moscovici cited in Clift 1999: 17). The party’s understanding of heightened 
capital mobility compelled it, therefore, to operate within the perceived margins of economic 
manoeuvrability ‘gained by perceived overall rectitude’ (Moscovici cited in Clift 1999: 5), 
and thus not act to undermine credibility in the eyes of financial markets. 
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This adherence to a norm of ‘overall rectitude’ is clearly reflected within the party’s fiscal 
policies. For example, a significant reform of the healthcare system, the Couverture Maladie 
Universelle (CMU) policy, provided supplementary healthcare insurance to an estimated 6 
million disadvantaged French citizens free of charge on a means-tested basis (Clift 2002b: 
332; Levy 2001: 275-6). Moreover, like New Labour, a key aspect of the PS’s welfare 
strategy was reducing youth unemployment. Yet, unlike Labour’s ‘workfare’ New Deal 
programme, The Programme Emploi Jeunes (PEJ), or the Aubry Plan, funded (up to around 
80%) 700,000 new jobs, half of which were to be within the public sector, to tackle 
unemployment (Merkel 2000: 29). The PEJ provided state subsidies for employment for up to 
five years for young unemployed people with little work experience (Levy 2001: 276). 
Though undoubtedly bold, and unlike anything New Labour may have pursued during this 
period, it should be recognised that these policies were seen as achievable only within a 
credible fiscal framework. 
Though both the CMU and the PEJ came at significant cost, the policies were largely funded 
through ‘cost shuffling’, rather than large increases in expenditure that might concern the 
markets (Levy 2001: 275). The reforms cleverly channelled resources ‘to a select few, highly 
visible, progressive projects’ (Levy 2001: 275), but ultimately Jospin remained cautious to 
respect Maastricht convergence criteria. The government, for example, cut the budget deficit 
to meet the SGP’s 3 percent target and reversed the trend of rising public debt by 1998, 
ensuring that it did not exceed the 60 percent of GDP threshold (OECD 1999: 11; OECD 
2001: 48, Figure 12). Whilst the PS rejected the exacting neoliberal policy framework 
prescribed by globalists, their understanding of the need to make explicit their fiscal 
discipline to global financial markets forced them into accepting a fiscal ‘limit’ of sorts.  
Analysis 
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The above section has attempted to illustrate how the fiscal policies of Labour and the 
PS were shaped by their respective interpretations of the global financial order. Labour, 
operating within a more highly liberalised political economy post-Thatcher, followed a 
globalist reading and were quick to establish a clear message and strategy of fiscal discipline. 
The PS, however, were able to draw upon a wide dissatisfaction with neoliberalism and 
expressed a more politicised understanding of the impact of globalising markets. This 
allowed them to implement more ambitious fiscal policy, albeit within a broader framework 
of perceived economic rectitude. This very difference is, in itself, telling; it clearly shows 
how two social democratic parties in otherwise ostensibly similar circumstances constructed 
different readings of how financial globalisation compelled them to act fiscally. Building 
upon this, it is clear from the review of the existing literature that the impact of financial 
globalisation on state capacity remains a hotly contested area of discussion.  
The first wave literature referenced the enormous quantities of ‘disconnected capital’ which 
exerts downward pressure on fiscal policies, resulting in a ‘race to the bottom’. However, 
later works within the second wave helped to show the weaknesses in the argument that 
financial globalisation has necessitated neoliberal convergence, and even illustrated that 
financial integration may not be developing in the way expected under the globalisation 
thesis. By looking a little more closely at the bond and equity markets in these two cases, it is 
possible to explore the relationship between the economic arguments put forward by Labour 
and the PS and the reality of British and French financial integration in global markets. 
It is manifest that financial markets have grown exponentially in the last few decades, and the 
data on bond and equity markets confirms this. Engelen and Konings (2010), in a 
comparative study of financialization that includes both the UK and France, find significant 
evidence of the growth of financial markets. They show that the size of the global bond 
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market increased almost fourfold between 1990 and 2006, whilst equity markets increased 
tenfold in this time (Engelen and Konings 2010: 2). Moreover, they note that in 2008 these 
markets accounted for over 250 percent of GDP in both the UK and France (Figure 21.1 in 
Engelen and Konings 2010: 7). Such figures, which point to the growing financialization of 
European economies, appear to confirm the theories of globalists that highlight the impact of 
capital mobility. Yet, a consideration of the character of these markets presents a more 
confusing picture than would be expected under conditions of globalisation. 
Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s suggested that markets for bond and equity portfolio 
investments expressed a clear ‘home bias’ (see French and Poterba 1991; see Feldstein and 
Horioka 1980; Tesar and Werner 1995). Yet, despite French and Poterba suggesting in 1991 
that the ‘puzzle’ of home bias within financial investment may recede and the levels of cross-
border equity investments grow (in line with globalisation theory) (French and Poterba 1991: 
225), a decade later, in 2003, it was still not possible to claim this. The data shows clearly 
that institutional investors in both the UK and France were still investing heavily in their 
domestic and the Eurozone economies. In the UK, for example, 77.8% of investors’ equity 
portfolios were held in the UK and Eurozone, whilst for France this figure stood at 87.2%. 
Moreover, UK and French investors’ bond portfolio allocations show even stronger regional 
investment tendencies, with investment rates into the UK and Eurozone at 78.5% and 90.8% 
of total investments respectively (adapted from Tables 3.1a and 3.1b in Hay and Wincott 
2012: 87). Rather than a global enmeshment of bond and equity markets, the data shows a 
much greater level of regional financial integration, or indeed, ‘Europeanisation’ 
(Kleinknecht and ter Wengel 1998; Vandenbroucke 1998), if perhaps also some level of 
‘Triadisation’ (Hay and Wincott 2012: 86; see Hirst and Thompson 1996; 1999) evident in 
the British economy. It is possible, therefore, to account for a significant proportion of this 
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capital movement in terms of financial ‘churn’ within the European regional economy (Hirst 
1999: 86). 
It is salient to note immediately, therefore, the disparity that has emerged in this analysis 
between the presentation of financial integration by Labour and the PS and the actual 
character of bond and equity investments. This disparity is particularly clear in the case of 
Labour, who, as detailed above, presented an extremely assured picture of financial 
globalisation. Although the PS did not follow this thesis precisely, their acceptance of the 
fiscal limitations placed upon them by EU-level directives was a product of their 
understanding of globally integrated financial markets. When the willingness of investors to 
hold their capital within their domestic and regional economies is considered, it becomes 
clear that the calibration of social democratic fiscal policies in line with the theory of near 
perfect capital mobility under conditions of globalisation was somewhat zealous. Indeed, 
making the distinction between a truly global economy and simply a more regionally, or 
indeed internationally, integrated economy is so important because, as has already been 
explored by others within the literature, there can be differential expectations for 
governmental capacity under these two conditions. 
As Hirst and Thompson (1999: 10) suggested, in a truly global economy, domestic 
economies would be expected to become ‘subsumed’, but within an international economy 
states could be expected to retain a much greater degree of autonomy. Moreover, rather than 
the ‘race to the bottom’ which may be expected within the globalisation thesis, a regional 
European economy may be more accurately characterised by diverse and significant state 
involvement in the economy. It is clear, for example, that there are factors beyond ‘cost 
competitiveness’, such as the specialisation of skills and suppliers, that provide incentives for 
business to invest in ‘high-cost’ markets, such as those in Britain and France and Europe 
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more generally (see Kleinknecht and ter Wengel 1998: 645-6; Callaghan and Tunney 2000: 
70; see Hay 2012 criticism of ‘cost competitiveness’). This argument is also particularly well 
reflected in the high geographical concentration of research and development by major 
corporations who rely on markets providing consistently high levels of workforce education 
and discipline, as well as a strong legal infrastructure (see Patel 1995; Patel and Pavitt 1996; 
Hirst 1997: 419). The Nordic economies, for instance, which historically have had extremely 
high levels of public investment in education and training, were seen to reap the benefits of 
this government expenditure in the 1990s and 2000s (Pontusson 2011: 100-107).  
The domestic and regional bias found within the financial markets belies the warnings of 
rapid footloose capital, which may be expected in truly globally integrated markets. 
Moreover, public investment levels in Europe can clearly form part of an economy’s 
investment attractiveness. This is not to say that there are no structural pressures emanating 
from financial integration that apply downward pressure on states, and by extension, social 
democrats, or that these pressures cannot develop. However, this section has attempted, more 
narrowly, to demonstrate that both Labour and the PS assembled particular approaches to 
fiscal policy which reflected their perception of global financial markets, which ultimately 
served to delimit their fiscal activism. What the analysis of bond and equity markets shows, 
when coupled with the differences in the two parties’ interpretations of economic 
globalisation, is the contingency of the policy paradigms formed within each political 
economy.  
This section has not sought to explain why social democrats may come to engage with 
economic arguments in this way (although see Hirst and Thompson 1996: 6; Hay and 
Rosamond 2002 for debate on this), it has merely hoped to show that both social democratic 
parties framed their fiscal strategies in line with their perceptions of global financial market 
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integration (see Hay and Rosamond 2002; Dearlove 2000: 114). Put more simply, it shows 
that ‘concepts have consequences’ (Hirst 1997: 424; see Gill 1994). The following section, 
therefore, seeks to apply this framework of analysis to the contemporary post-GFC situation. 
It does so in order to discover the dynamics of each party’s contemporary relationships with 
conceptualisations of the financial markets and the impact that these have on their fiscal 
activism.  
 
A ‘Crisis’, but Not for Social Democracy 
The findings already detailed in this article confirm Hay and Rosamond’s (2002) 
sentiment that globalisation was an important ideational constraint; yet, as the following 
section shows, it appears that a similar statement could be made today about the dominant 
discourse which surrounds the GFC and subsequent Eurozone crisis. As the review of the 
literature has shown, the financial crisis of 2008 did initially spark a neo-Keynesian revival of 
sorts, as the US and governments across Europe engaged in co-ordinated fiscal stimulus and 
injected liquidity into markets by bailing out struggling banks and industries. Yet, some six 
years on, as austerity policies dominate crisis recovery management strategies in Europe, it is 
clear that, in the longer term, social democrats were not able to successfully ‘seize the coat-
tails’ of the crisis. As the preceding section did with the global financial markets and capital 
flight, this section will explore how each party has engaged with key economic arguments 
surrounding recovery management in the post-crisis context, and what effect this has had 
upon their fiscal policies. It does so by firstly taking a succinct look at the nature and causes 
of the Eurozone crisis and the stark disagreements therein. It then presents each case in terms 
of the post-crisis situation before setting out its analysis, including a brief consideration of 
social democratic fiscal potential in the contemporary context. 
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The crisis context 
In order to comprehend the policy regimes of the PS and Labour it is first important to 
consider the context in which they have been constructed. Despite the GFC originating from 
a speculative bubble of private credit on the balance sheets of the banking sector, the source 
of the crisis soon became obscured. Within months of Greece’s recognition in 2010 that its 
public deficit was far larger than it had previously suggested, the perception that lax public 
spending policies brought about the European crisis per se came to dominate the debate and 
began to be used to justify programmes of fiscal consolidation (Boyer 2012: 284; Blyth 
2013a; King et al. 2012: 2). This interpretation misconstrues the nature of the crisis in 
Europe. Indeed, the majority of European governments in the years previous to the crisis 
(with the exception of Greece) were ‘consistently reducing public debt/GDP ratios, lowering 
the deficit/GDP ratios or generating handsome surpluses’ (Laski and Podkaminer 2012: 254). 
The large public debt burdens faced by many European states today are the products of the 
crisis, not its cause. The current situation is, more accurately, attributable to two related 
underlying growth problems in Europe. 
Firstly, it should be recognised that the crisis impacted first and most severely upon those 
economies, such as the UK, Spain and Ireland, whose private debt-led growth tied their 
fortunes too intimately to interest rates. These economies not only felt the contagion effects 
associated with their exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, but experienced their 
own crises as their domestic housing and consumer bubbles burst as a result of rising interest 
rates (see Hay and Wincott 2012: 200-4). Additionally, in the years previous to the crisis, the 
Economic and Monetary Union’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ accession criteria, which enforces 
conditions of low inflation, exchange rate stability and low public deficit and debt, led to the 
deterioration of competitiveness in many Southern economies including Italy, Portugal and 
   23 
 
Greece (Boyer 2012: 290; Laski and Podkaminer 2012; Petit 2012). Both of these situations 
are resultant not from governmental profligacy, but from the failings of regulatory liberalism 
(Mügge 2011), both within EU architecture and national growth models, which permitted 
systemic fragility and volatility. Mainstream liberal economic thinking was not able, 
therefore, to anticipate the present crisis and even served to induce it (Boyer 2013; Hay 2013; 
Mügge 2011; Ryner 2012). The following sections seek to set out how both parties have 
constructed their fiscal policies within this post-crisis political economic environment.   
The Parti Socialiste 
In May 2012 the French electorate voted for its second Socialist President of the Fifth 
Republic, carrying François Hollande into the Élysée Palace. Hollande was elected on a 
platform that rejected the incumbent Sarkozy’s programme, as well as his manner of 
governing (see Hewlett 2012), with Hollande’s call for ‘le changement’ seeking to halt 
austerity and instead concentrate upon a growth-orientated strategy for crisis management 
through reviving employment and industrial production (Hollande 2012). The party has, 
however, been relatively limited in its pledges of fiscal activism. Hollande has pledged to 
build 2.5 million houses over the five years, an increase of 300,000 on Sarkozy’s tenure, and 
committed to large-scale public investment for public-sector employment, including 150,000 
new ‘jobs for the future’ for the young and 60,000 new jobs in the education sector alone 
(Hollande 2012: 18, 24-25). Moreover, a significant aspect of Hollande’s ambitious campaign 
platform was, in terms reminiscent of Jospin’s plans for European level activism, based upon 
a renegotiation of the terms of the new European Fiscal Compact in order to instil ‘measures 
of growth’ into a treaty perceived as holding a German-led deflationary bias (see also Clift 
2013a: 119). These commitments represent the PS’s method of constructing a recovery 
programme without sacrificing the French social model (see also Grossman and Sauger 2014: 
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87). Nevertheless, Hollande’s ambitions for French economic recovery should not be 
characterised by these policies alone.  
The PS’s programme to date has, rather, also included ambitious targets for fiscal 
consolidation. In a clear attempt to assuage market trepidation, alongside the measures for 
growth outlined above, the Hollande’s programme has contained what Clift has described as 
a ‘herculean effort’ of fiscal consolidation (Clift 2013a: 117; Clift 2014: 2-6; Clift and Ryner 
2014: 147). For instance, although it was unable to meet its target, Ayrault’s government 
originally pledged to reduce the deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 2013 (Hollande 2012: 11). 
Moreover, Hollande promised to work with, if in slightly adjusted terms, Sarkozy’s fiscal 
consolidation plans, suggesting a balanced budget would be achieved by the end of his term 
in 2017 (Hollande 2012: 40). In order to achieve this the government would need to enact an 
‘historic’ 7 percent turnaround in the structural balance between 2012 and 2017 (Clift 2014: 
2). On debt, similarly, Hollande has publically pledged to ensure ‘that there is not one euro 
[of public debt] more at the end of my term’ (Hollande cited in Le Monde 2012).  
As set out in Hollande’s ‘60 engagements’ (Hollande 2012), the drive for fiscal consolidation 
is focused heavily on a robust and progressive taxation system at the expense of deep 
expenditure cuts. The construction of a more equitable fiscal regime, as put forward by the 
PS, is based upon higher rates for high-earners, including a 45% rate for income over 
€150,000 and a 75% rate for those earning €1m and above, merging income tax and CSG 
payments and taxing capital at the same rate as income. Again, this can be seen as an attempt 
by the PS to operate a more equitable social democratic programme for recovery.  
Nevertheless, Hollande has not sought to move away more broadly from the perceived 
boundaries of financial rectitude required to balance public finances. This is evident in his 
limited programme for fiscal expenditure, and the government’s ambitious signalling to 
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financial markets of its attitude towards France’s debt and deficit. Furthermore, Hollande’s 
call for a greater focus on growth at EU level has not materialised. Although unable to 
successfully renegotiate the terms of the new Fiscal Compact, Hollande has gone one step 
further and enshrined its rules in French law (see Clift and Ryner 2014: 149). This declaration 
of rectitude has, therefore, come at the expense of strengthening tangible constraints on 
French economic policy makers.  
The Labour Party 
Despite what has been set out in the preceding section, the experience of the Socialists 
in power has been interpreted unambiguously by the right in Britain as proof of the failure of 
a Keynesian response to the crisis. David Cameron, in a thinly-veiled criticism of the French 
government, told British voters to look to other countries to consider, ‘how disastrous a return 
to Labour-style economics would be’ for recovery (Cameron 2014; see also Haldenby 2014). 
Indeed, this quote captures a wider discourse which permeates the contemporary British 
political economy. It caricatures the New Labour government as profligate in the years 
preceding the crisis, and reinforces the image of austerity measures as the necessary ‘penance 
after the immoral party’ (Blyth 2013a: 6) of the Labour administration. This message 
subverts the actual nature of the financial crisis and subsequent Eurozone crisis, as it focuses 
primarily upon excessive public spending as a contributing factor in the crisis. Nevertheless, 
this has manifestly impacted upon Labour, with the party being compelled into asserting its 
understanding of the need for fiscal consolidation as a means of refuting claims of ‘deficit 
denial’ (see Balls 2012; see Balls 2013; Wintour 2011). It is within this context that the party, 
in opposition under Ed Miliband, is having to shape its policies. 
Miliband’s proposed programme for a Labour government in 2015 sets out some ambitious 
reforms to the nature of British capitalism. Since 2012 Labour has adopted the concept of 
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‘One Nation Labour’ (see Wood 2013) as a vehicle for its policies, and within this it has a 
two-pronged approach to developing a new fiscal stance. The first of these is an emphasis on 
‘responsibility’, which posits an enhanced role for the contributory principle at the heart of 
the welfare system (Wood 2013: 319). This concept of ‘responsibility’ has allowed Labour to 
appear tougher on welfare, and establish policy initiatives such as a ‘Compulsory Jobs 
Guarantee’, which will offer a paid job to the young and long-term unemployed which they 
must take or lose their welfare payments (Balls 2014). Perhaps a more significant 
development, however, has been the adoption of the idea of ‘predistribution’ (see Hacker 
2008; Miliband cited in Cowley 2011). Principally this concept seeks to ‘encourage a more 
equal distribution of economic power and rewards even before government collects taxes or 
pays out benefits’ (Hacker 2008: 35). The Party’s plan, therefore, involves tax incentives for 
employers offering the living wage and a pledge to increase the minimum wage to £8 per 
hour by 2020 (The Labour Party 2014). Furthermore, the party has suggested it will provide 
an extra £2.5bn each year for the National Health Service and build 200,000 homes per year 
(Balls 2014), almost doubling the house building effort since 2008 (DCLG 2014: 4).  
Much of these proposals are undeniably more ‘social democratic’ than the New Labour 
policy regime under Blair. Particularly with regard to the idea of predistribution, the party is 
seeking to reimagine the state-market relationship through employing a greater level of state 
involvement in the labour market in order to negate the requirement for welfare payments to 
top-up wages and boost consumption. However, it should be noted that these policies seek to 
emphasise reorganisation over redistribution. Labour has made clear that it seeks to match a 
‘fairer approach to deficit reduction with an iron discipline on spending control’ (Balls 2013). 
In order to do so, Shadow Chancellor Balls has repeatedly asserted the need for ‘tough fiscal 
rules’ (Balls 2013; 2014), pledging, for example, that Labour will not fund any spending 
through additional borrowing, including for capital investment, and will match the 
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government’s day to day spending totals for 2015/16 (Balls 2013; 2014; Eaton 2014). Pledges 
such as additional house building and funding for the NHS are accounted for within the 
existing capital settlement for the next parliament (Eaton 2014) and tax adjustments, 
including a new ‘mansion tax’ on houses valued over £2m, respectively. The Party has, 
therefore, sought to reconcile progressive economic policy with a commitment to ‘sound 
public finances’ by matching Conservative spending patterns, and highlighting its cost-
neutral fiscal stance. 
This section has set out how both parties have sought to construct their economic policies in 
the post-GFC context. It has shown that both parties have attempted to reconcile their aim of 
achieving a more progressive recovery management strategy with appeals to sound financial 
management. How each party has done so varies based upon factors, including the climate of 
the domestic political economy, which serve to filter perceptions of adequate recovery 
management strategies. It is the intention of the following section, therefore, to look more 
closely at the construction of these responses to the financial crisis. It does so, once again, 
through an analysis of financial market volatility and a consideration of the ongoing viability 
of a progressive fiscal programme. 
 
Analysis 
It is clear that both the PS and Labour, albeit to varying degrees and through different 
strategies, have tempered their fiscal activism as a result of the perceived requirement to 
establish financial rectitude in the face of markets. As with the globalisation debate a decade 
ago, the parties have accommodated a dominant narrative of the crisis which has narrowed 
their fiscal capacity. It is interesting to note that after the financial crisis, at least initially, the 
veracity of the globalist logic was questioned by Tony Blair, when he admitted that the GFC 
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was, ‘putting into contention what seemed previously unshakeable orthodoxy’ (Blair 2009). 
This statement in itself serves to support the argument put forward already in this study, 
proving the contingent nature of New Labour’s construction of its economic policies. 
However, the present circumstances in both France and the UK attest to the continuing 
challenges faced by European social democrats; although the weaknesses of regulatory 
liberalism have been exposed by the crisis, and the strength of neoliberal ideas dented, it is 
clear that a similar line of thinking continues to inform the post-crisis recovery management 
programmes in Europe (see Boyer 2012; Callinicos 2012). Reassessing the situation, 
therefore, as this section sets out to do, is an important first step in helping to understand the 
nature of contemporary social democratic economic policy capacity in France and the UK.    
The first half of Hollande’s term as President has, by most accounts, been extremely 
unpopular, whilst the economy has been characterised by weak growth (European 
Commission 2014: 66-67). The contemporary situation in France, however, has been 
mischaracterised in some quarters as the inevitable result of a Keynesian recovery 
management programme, or indeed, a ‘failed socialist experiment’ (see Heath 2014; 
Haldenby 2014). Upon Hollande’s accession some commentators were, in line with the 
structural dependency theory, quick to declare that Hollande’s policies would quickly be 
punished by the markets. The Daily Telegraph, for instance, suggested that, ‘traders, rating 
agencies and the European Union at large could soon be “manning the barricades”’, with the 
end of the “Merkozy” era of neoliberal solidarity ‘high on the markets’ worry list’ 
(Waterfield 2012; Gribben 2012). Yet, such fears were not allied with reality.  
Within days of Hollande’s inauguration Wall Street Journal commentators admitted that 
warnings of ‘the bond vigilantes riding in to punish France for electing an austerity-bashing 
Socialist’ were wrong, as the yield on the 10-year government bonds fell (Watts 2012). A 
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positive bond auction in early June also suggested that investors were ‘cautiously accepting 
the new government's economic policy’ (Bartha 2012), whilst by mid-July 2012, after the PS 
had swept to a majority in the legislative elections, the yield on 10-year government bonds 
fell to a low of 2.07 percent, far lower than it had been in the previous five years under 
Sarkozy (Bloomberg a.). Whilst growth has been weak, capacity did exist, at least early on, 
for a greater degree of fiscal activism, and, indeed, has even been called for by the IMF (see 
Clift 2013b). Had Hollande been able to build upon this momentum and deliver a clear and 
consistent programme of fiscal activism to support growth, the PS may have been in a strong 
position to shape the terms of the French recovery.  
A direct comparison here with Labour in opposition is, of course, not possible. However, 
Labour’s strategy shows an even greater degree of willingness to signal their financial 
rectitude to markets. Yet, analysis of the bond markets does not suggest that the imposition of 
a state of ‘perma-austerity’ is inevitable. France saw the yield on its 10 year bonds reduce 
from an average of close to 3.5% in 2010-12 under Sarkozy, to below 2% in 2014 under 
Hollande. The yield on 10 year UK government bonds during this period has similarly 
dropped from around 4% to nearer 2.5% (Bloomberg a.; Bloomberg b.). In both cases, 
therefore, borrowing remains relatively cheap. Given the fiscal constraints Labour has placed 
upon itself, there appears to be a largely untapped resource of policy space.  
Not only do the bond markets suggest that permanent austerity is not inevitable, the premise 
that austerity is the necessary solution to the rising cost of debt (see Streeck 2011; Streeck 
and Mertens 2011) also does not hold up. For example, in the UK under the Coalition 
government, which has pursued aggressive fiscal consolidation through austerity measures, 
gross government debt increased from 78.4% to 90.6% of GDP between 2010 and 2013 
(Eurostat). Thus, whilst the commitment of both parties to reducing their respective debt and 
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deficits is understandable, the extent to which it has impacted upon their perceived ability to 
spend is questionable. This can, however, be directly related to the construction of the 
narrative of debt, which has conflated sovereign debt with explanations of the underlying 
causes of the crisis. 
In contrast to the narrative of the debt crisis argument, rising levels of debt since 2008 were 
not causal factors in the crisis, but a consequence of the crisis – initiated by bailout 
programmes and exacerbated greatly by reduced growth and lost taxation revenue. Both 
France and the UK attest to this argument. UK government debt under Labour declined from 
49.7 percent of GDP in 1998 to 42.7 percent by 2007, yet spiked to over 85 percent of GDP 
in 2010 (OECD a; see Wren-Lewis 2013) as the government bailed out its domestic banks. 
Moreover, whilst French debt stood at a higher level, it had been reducing under the 
conservative Sarkozy in the years before the crisis, before jumping from 52.1 percent of GDP 
in 2007 to 67.4 percent in 2010 (OECD a.). 
It may well be that, for the PS, calls to pursue a more expansionary fiscal path have passed. 
Given Hollande’s own ‘U-turn’ of sorts under Prime Minister Valls, in which he has asserted 
a new focus on supply side measures, including a ‘responsibility pact’ between businesses 
and the state (Hollande 2013), it appears unlikely any great act of fiscal expansion will occur. 
Yet, Labour has so far also shut itself off from this potential. This is despite the fact that some 
86 percent of the UK’s current account deficit in 2009-10 was attributable to lost taxation 
revenue since the crisis began (Hay and Wincott 2012: 220). Labour’s ability to carry out an 
expansive programme for growth, therefore, continues to be restrained more by its own 
inability to assert an alternative to the neoliberal account of the crisis (see Coates 2013; 
Crouch 2013; Rogers 2013). Although under Miliband the Labour party has expressed 
imaginative ways of reconfiguring the nature of British capitalism, its proposed programme 
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risks, in a similar vein to Hollande, not being able to support growth sufficiently as a result of 
its unwillingness to break from the perceived parameters of financial discipline required. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has shown how social democratic economic policy capacity in France and 
the UK has been, and continues to be, restricted by the accommodation of contested 
economic ideas as de facto structural conditions. To do so it has developed an understanding 
of how the debate over economic globalisation and its implications for progressive economic 
policy, which was particularly vociferous in the decade before the crisis, continues to provide 
an important insight into the post-crisis context for social democrats. The discourse and 
narratives which surround the crisis today present a confused understanding of the situation, 
which serves to implicate progressive economic policies and thus hurt social democratic 
governments. By internalising neoliberal ideas about the political economy both pre- and 
post-crisis, albeit to varying degrees and through different lenses, the PS and Labour have 
continued to give credence to the theory that in the contemporary global economy public 
expenditure will always go punished by markets.  
Through drawing upon data on the integration of markets for bond and equity investments, 
the first half of this article’s analysis highlighted that the economic globalisation thesis 
cannot in itself explain the policy limitations of either the Parti Socialiste or Labour. Indeed, 
it demonstrated how each party’s engagement with the idea of globalisation served to 
calibrate their fiscal policies. New Labour’s largely globalist understanding of the economic 
situation ultimately led the party in to adopting a supposedly rationalist, technocratic 
approach to governance that was demanded by the global economy. Whilst the PS did not 
accept this, and followed a more ‘political’ path, their understanding of the logic of 
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globalisation compelled them to accept a restricted approach to fiscal policy espoused at EU-
level. The policy strategies of social democrats in France and the UK were, therefore, not 
necessitated by conditions of economic globalisation, but were guided by their perceptions of 
global economic interconnectedness.  
As the article’s final section has shown, however, it is apparent that today, in post-crisis 
Europe, a similar statement could be made. The dominant discourse of the ‘debt crisis’ has 
served to support a renewed ‘no alternative’ narrative and reinforces the notion that 
government spending must necessarily be restricted under the prevailing economic 
conditions. Such accounts of the crisis share a common lineage with first wave globalist 
arguments, both of which suggest that the contemporary structural dependence of the state 
upon capital markets now renders social democracy unviable.  
Drawing upon this study’s analysis of the economic globalisation thesis, it has been possible 
to show that social democrats in Britain and France have internalised contested notions about 
the role of the state at the expense of their own economic policy capacities. Moreover, the 
continuing accommodation of a neoliberal account of the crisis in Europe by Labour, and the 
restrictions this has placed upon the PS in government, belies the situation at hand. Social 
democrats today remain legitimate political actors who, at both domestic and regional levels, 
have an important role to play in resisting the unfounded discourse and narratives which are 
shaping the post-crisis European political economy. 
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